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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2017  
TAGS: [ETTC](#) [MNUC](#) [MTCRE](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [KNNP](#) [SN](#)  
SUBJECT: MFA PROVIDES BLOCKED SHIPMENTS UPDATES

REF: A. 06 STATE 204021  
[B](#). 06 STATE 185541  
[C](#). 06 STATE 184097  
[D](#). 06 SINGAPORE 3849

Classified By: E/P Counselor Ike Reed for reasons 1.4(c) and (d)

[1](#)1. (SBU) Michelle Teo-Jacob, Assistant Director of MFA's International Organizations Directorate, on January 3 provided us updates on three outstanding export control and nonproliferation cases. She presented us with two non-papers, reproduced in paragraphs 6 and 7.

[1](#)2. (S) Teo-Jacob began with the shipment of chromium-nickel steel plates (Ref C) that Singapore seized at USG request on November 8, 2006. She reported that Singapore had independently confirmed that China was the source and that Iran was the final destination for the plates but that the GOS was unable to determine if they were intended for use in a WMD program. Therefore, the GOS had no legal basis to continue detaining the shipment and had decided to release the plates to the shipping company, provided it returned them to China. Teo-Jacob said that Singapore would monitor the plates' return and recommended we do the same.

[1](#)3. (S) Turning to the Weining Pte Ltd case (Ref B), Teo-Jacob told us that GOS officials had investigated the company and found no evidence that it had procured Japanese-origin carbon fiber on behalf of a Pakistani missile program entity. However, the GOS investigation confirmed that Weining, an engineering equipment company, had exported to Pakistan, among other countries. Teo-Jacob said that the GOS had used the industry outreach program associated with Singapore's announced expansion of its export control list as a pretext for contacting Weining and had advised the company that it was under surveillance and warned it not to engage in any proliferation activities. She suggested that we should now pursue this matter with Tokyo.

[1](#)4. (S) Finally, Teo-Jacob raised the shipment of precision lathes (Ref D) that Singapore had detained in December in response to a USG request. She said some of the equipment might be of concern but that the GOS needed further information on the lathes' tolerances from the USG (conveyed through separate channels) in order to determine whether the lathes were regulated under any multilateral nonproliferation regimes. Teo-Jacob stressed that the ability to legally justify seizures was of utmost importance to the GOS. E/P Counselor took this opportunity to deliver the points and non-paper provided in Ref A.

15. (S) Teo-Jacob said that the recent increase in USG requests (and GOS compliance) to stop shipments as they pass through Singapore, while "not insurmountable", had caused waves in the shipping industry. In her opinion, any actions that slowed the transfer of potentially dangerous goods to countries of concern were valuable. Decisions like the one to return the steel plates to China, however, had been the source of much discussion amongst GOS agencies, she said.

16. (S) Begin text of steel plates non-paper:

SECRET

SIPDIS

NON-PAPER

We thank the U.S. for the information shared with MFA through the U.S. Embassy on 8 and 22 November 2006, concerning the possible transshipment of chromium-nickel steel plates for Iran,s missile programme through Singapore.

The relevant authorities have followed up on this matter. We have ascertained through independent sources that the steel plates originated from China and are bound for Iran through Dubai. However, we are unable to ascertain if they are intended for WMD purposes and have no legal basis to continue to detain the steel plates. Therefore, the relevant authorities have decided to release the steel plates to the shipping company on the undertaking that they be returned to China to their Chinese owners.

The U.S. may wish to pursue this matter further with its Chinese counterparts. On its part, Singapore authorities will also continue to monitor the shipment of the steel plates from Singapore to its destination of China.  
3 January 2007

End text of non-paper.

17. (S) Begin text of carbon fiber non-paper:

SECRET

SIPDIS

NON-PAPER

We thank the U.S. for the information shared with MFA through the U.S. Embassy on 17 November 2006 concerning the Singapore company, Weining Pte Ltd, which may be working to procure Japanese-origin carbon fibre on behalf of a Pakistani missile development organization, possibly the National Development Complex (NDC).

The relevant authorities have followed up on this matter. The company,s core business is in the trading of engineering equipment for oil, gas and water treatment, although it does on occasion also trade in other goods when requested by regular customers. The bulk of the company,s business is local but it also exports to Pakistan, Malaysia and a few other countries in the region. Our officials have advised Weining Pte Ltd not to engage in any illicit activities that supports (sic) the development of WMD programmes by countries of proliferation concern which would include Pakistan.

The U.S. should now follow up by further pursuing this matter with its Japanese counterparts as the carbon fibres are likely of Japanese origin. Singapore authorities will continue to monitor the company,s activities. We will not hesitate to take appropriate action, should the company be found to have committed any offence under our laws.

3 January 2007

End text of second non-paper.

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